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‘I didn’t ask for this.’ So said my mum suddenly
hospitalized with loss of memory and mobility. My
response, that no one does, seemed bleak and unhelp-
ful, failing to address the sense of injustice that lay
behind the comment. It strikes me now as being in a
similar vein to those who mock the idea of people
trying to make sense of a calamity: ‘It doesn’t take
anything to make sense of a lorry ploughing into a
school – it’s very simple.’ But the mockery, like my
response, is almost wilfully obtuse. Calamities shake
us in a number of ways, one of the main ones being
they threaten our sense of justice; attempts to make
sense of them are therefore part of our dialogue
about justice.
Justice is a complex notion but calamities seem to
violate two criteria.The first is that how we fare in life
should largely be a product of our choices and char-
acter; the second, that life’s benefits and burdens
should be shared fairly across society. The term
‘should’ here is ambiguous. Roughly, though, it means,
first, that insofar as life is just these criteria will be met
and, second, that insofar as we seek to be just we will
seek to create societies and behave individually in
ways that meet these criteria.
One way in which we make sense of serious illness
is to say it meets the first criterion; serious illness is
the product of our behaviour and choices. Perhaps the
paradigm is lung cancer that results from smoking.
Much public health discussion and policy seems
driven by this belief. But, of course, a cursory exami-
nation shows the belief often and perhaps usually to
be false.The memory and mobility loss suffered by my
mum is presumably largely because of a combination
of genetic and circumstantial factors inherited in life’s
lottery. Her sister has similar problems; perhaps I will
too. Despite this, I have heard others and even myself
seeking to attribute cause or blame: ‘She never really
looked after herself’, ‘She used to smoke’, and so on.
The desire to find justice is strong even in the face of
obvious counter example. We are negotiating a deal
with fate: I shall look after myself, I will not smoke,
and I will reap the reward, my life will go well, I shall
be happy.
But the etymology of the term, happiness, gives fair
warning of our situation (McMahon, 2007). Its origins
are in the Middle English and Old Norse Happ
meaning chance or fortune. These origins are shared
with terms such as happens, hap-hazard, happen-
stance, and perhaps. Little wonder, then, that our
search for happiness should seem hapless. Perhaps
happiness is a gift rather than a reward. For this
reason among others, the term happiness is not nec-
essarily a poor translation for the classical Greek
eudaimonia. An alternative translation is, of course,
flourishing (Charles, 1984); but this translation is
locked closely to the account of eudaimonia given by
the Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle.Happi-
ness or even ‘Someone to watch over me’ might
capture better its idiomatic use in classical Greece.
Greek myths, such as those recounted by Homer,
include many stories of good or ill meted out to indi-
viduals by capricious and sometimes apparently
unjust gods. A similar sense is conveyed in the Old
Testament book of Job in which the Judaic god
behaves very like an Olympian one, effectively having
a bet with the devil about what will happen if he
destroys a good man’s family and well-being.
But one message from the monotheistic traditions
is importantly different from that of classical Greece.
This is that the one god is just, although sometimes
puzzling, and that the injustice in this world will be
righted in the next. In other religious traditions the
righting occurs through rebirth. Aristotle and most
classical philosophers did not take these routes. One
way of reading the ethics of Aristotle, Epicurus and
the Stoics is as an attempt to show that the first crite-
rion of justice is true, that how life goes is a product of
character and choice; and that the second criterion
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follows, that we should choose to be just and to imple-
ment justice. If we are just our lives will go well; if not,
they will go badly.
How, then, would these philosophers view the
calamitous illnesses visited on some without any
obvious link to justice or desert? Aristotle’s line is
different to that of the later Hellenistic tradition. For
him, temperance is a virtue in part, at least, because
of its link to health (Nicomachean Ethics 1119a).
Those who are intemperate through overindulgence
risk undermining the health required to live well, i.e.
as practical reason would dictate. The extent to
which the link between lifestyle and health was
made by Aristotle is not clear; it seems unlikely that
he would have had in mind the micro-management
of diet; more likely that he would have thought in
terms such as alcoholic overindulgence (Allmark,
2005). But it must have been clear to him, as it is to
us, that this is only part of the story; many who over-
indulge stay well; many who do not become seri-
ously ill. Aristotle’s line here seems to be that living
well, as virtue requires, only makes happiness pos-
sible; it does not guarantee it. He talks of the need
for external goods to ensure happiness (1178a).
These include sufficient intelligence and rationality,
money, and time for leisure. In doing so, he denies
the possibility of happiness for women and slaves
(both deemed irrational as a type) and menial
workers (who have insufficient leisure). Also
required is health that is good enough to allow the
person to live in accordance with virtue, something
presumably denied to those with incapacitating
illness (1115b; 1149a). As such illness can rob even
virtuous, leisured men of happiness.
Epicurus and the Stoics would not have this
(Annas, 1993; Nussbaum, 2009). They disliked the
exclusivity of Aristotle’s account of happiness and
disliked also its failure to meet the first criterion of
justice, that our fate is our own. Both Epicurus and
the Stoics believed that virtue is sufficient for happi-
ness even in the face of apparent misfortune. Happi-
ness is found in ataraxia, a state of indifference to the
pleasures and pains of the world, particularly bodily
ones. Ill-health is often related to pain; as such, this
account would say that it cannot undermine happi-
ness. Of dying, Epicurus says,
Going through this day of my life, which is at one and the
same time blissful and my last, I write this to you. My suf-
ferings from kidney stone and dysentery keep me continual
company, lacking nothing of their natural force. But over
against all these I set joy of the soul at the memory of our
past discussions. [cited and translated by Nussbaum (2009,
p. 111)]
It is unclear, however, how this approach can hold
up in the face of illness such as dementia. The illness
itself would seem to undermine ataraxia. The same
would hold true of most mental and some physical
illness, such as those where analgesia and anxiolitics
that undermine consciousness are required to control
symptoms.
To sum up, one way in which we make sense of
calamity is through reconciling it with our sense of
justice. Part of this is the sense that how our lives go
should be a product of how we run them. In many
religious traditions the apparent injustice is only put
right after death.This post-mortem righting of wrongs
is denied to most classical philosophers as to modern
atheists. The picture we get from the classical philoso-
phers is fairly bleak. Aristotle seems to hold out the
hope of happiness for the few, and good fortune plays
a large part in this. Epicurus and the Stoics hold out
the hope for many, but their vision of happiness as
indifferent to calamity seems implausible; indeed, it
seems to suggest that happiness is possible in this
world only for those who disdain its pleasures in order
to avoid its pain. Even then, calamities can surely yet
find you in the form of serious mental illness.
This ancient conflict between justice and fate
remains with us. Calamities baffle us precisely
because they seem to confound justice. In our narra-
tives making sense of serious illness we sometimes
call upon the religious justice-post-mortem tradition,
as when we say someone is in a better place, or is at
peace now. We also see attempts to reconcile justice
and fate that reflect those of Aristotle and later phi-
losophers. We speak with admiration of those who
battle, sometimes stoically, against their illness; and
we set their example against those who have just given
up. We seek to blame people for their illness;
heart disease and some cancers are down to lifestyle;
those who suffer these illnesses are set against the
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blameless; those who can rightfully say ‘I didn’t ask
for this.’ As nurses we should beware these stories;
they convey a falsehood, that illness is visited on those
who deserve it; they have the power to harm those we
care for, as when we attribute blame; they belong to a
world in which justice prevails; this, at best, is only
partially true of our own. I know this well when I sit
with my mum.
Peter Allmark
Sheffield Hallam University
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